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Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower
Courts After National Farmers Union and
Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment
of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial
System
Timothy W. Joranko*
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe1
and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,2 the Supreme
Court ruled that defendants in tribal court 3 actions must ex-
haust available tribal court remedies before proceeding with a
parallel action in federal court.4 At the same time, the Court
held that defendants could challenge the tribal court's exercise
of jurisdiction over them in federal court after exhausting tribal
court remedies. 5 These rulings, among the first in which the
high court dealt with the awkward relationship between tribal
and federal courts, 6 created a unique form of "two-way street"
between courts of separate sovereigns. In one direction, federal
courts must refer litigants otherwise properly in federal court to
tribal courts for exhaustion. In the other direction, federal
courts may review already-litigated cases to determine whether
tribal courts have exceeded their jurisdiction.
* Timothy W. Joranko is a Tribal Attorney for the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe of Indians in South Dakota. B-AL, Political Science, Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1983; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1986. The author wishes to thank
Mark Van Norman for reading this article and Jessica Herrera (HLS '95) for
helping with legal research.
1. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
2. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
3. The author uses "tribal court" as shorthand for the variety of tribal ju-
dicial, law-applying, or dispute-resolving forums. Some such forums are not
"courts" in the classic meaning of the term. The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that "[n]onjudicial tribal institutions ... [are] competent law-applying
bodies." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 (1978).
4. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
5. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857.
6. Prior to National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, only a handful of
decisions dealt with the relationship between federal and tribal courts. For a
discussion of those decisions, see infra notes 23-29.
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Numerous lower courts already apply this exhaustion doc-
trine. With the recent addition of the Seventh Circuit,7 courts in
six of the eleven circuits have decided exhaustion cases in the
six years since Iowa Mutual.8 With more tribes developing court
systems, and commercial activity between Indians and non-Indi-
ans increasing as a result of reservation economic development
efforts and gaming,9 Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union
will continue to grow in importance as a doctrine of federal court
jurisprudence.
This Article discusses the relationship between tribal courts
and federal courts as it has begun to emerge from the federal
circuits, and seeks to provide some direction for how the rela-
tionship should continue to develop in a manner consistent with
the dictates of federalism and the principles announced in Iowa
Mutual and National Farmers Union. After a brief historical
overview of the development of legal relations between tribes
and the United States in Part I, this Article focuses on the di-
verse manner in which federal courts have treated Iowa Mutual
and National Farmers Union. Part II describes the movement of
numerous cases from federal courts to tribal courts, analyzing
how the various circuits have implemented the requirement that
litigants exhaust their tribal court remedies. Part III addresses
the movement of the first few cases from tribal courts to federal
courts, and analyzes the treatment that federal courts give tri-
7. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993).
8. See id. at 812-15 (breach of contract action against Indian manufactur-
ing corporation); see also Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d
1166 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpleader action against Indian tribe and manager of
tribe's bingo hall); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992)
(legal malpractice and misrepresentation action against reservation attorney);
United States ex rel. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273
(8th Cir. 1987) (trespass action against tribal housing authority by tribal mem-
ber's estate); Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C.
1993) (contract dispute between non-Indian supplier of gaming machines and
non-Indian operator of gaming establishment located on reservation); Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 788 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (motion for preliminary injunction to compel arbitration of manage-
ment agreement by casino operator).
9. Tribal gaming has become a major source of economic development for
many tribes. In 1992, the volume of wagering in Indian-owned casinos, bingo
halls, and card rooms reportedly ranged between $7.5 billion and $15 billion.
James Popkin, Gambling with the Mob?, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 23,
1993 at 30, 31 (inset). Two of the most recent exhaustion decisions, and the
only east of the Great Lakes region, stemmed from disputes arising out of gam-
ing. See Tom's Amusement Co., 816 F. Supp. at 405; Tamiami Partners, Ltd.,
788 F. Supp. at 567. This illustrates the relation between the emergence of
tribal gaming and increased tribal court activity.
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bal court resolution of questions of law and fact after exhaustion
has occurred.
This Article concludes that giving fidelity to the Supreme
Court's rulings and the principles governing relationships be-
tween Indian tribes and the federal government requires federal
courts to apply a clear rule of requiring exhaustion in all cases
except when an exception that the Supreme Court has set forth
applies. In addition, principles of federalism and the relation-
ship between tribes and the federal government require federal
courts to apply tribal courts' interpretations of tribal law and to
adopt tribal courts' findings of fact, but allow federal courts to
review de novo tribal court interpretations of federal law.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: THE PLACEMENT OF
INDIAN TRIBES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Indian nations and their governments pre-existed the arri-
val of Europeans to the Americas.' 0 The first Europeans to
come to the Americas dealt with the Indian nations by war and
treaty, and considered them separate nations, apart from the
European newcomers."1 Prior to and upon gaining indepen-
dence, the United States continued the practice of entering trea-
ties with Indian nations, a practice that affirmed the separate
sovereign status of the Indian nations.' 2 In its earliest treaties,
the United States sometimes provided for a relationship be-
tween the judiciaries of the United States and the Indian na-
tions with which it treated, as the 1778 Treaty with the
Delawares illustrates:
For the better security of the peace and friendship now entered
into by the contracting parties, against all infractions of the same by
the citizens of either party, to the prejudice of the other, neither party
shall proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the
10. See generally, RONALD WhmmT, STOLEN CoN=muNFs 85-139 (1992) (dis-
cussing the invasions of the Cherokee and the Iroquois and describing the In-
dian nations as the European settlers found them); JAMEs R. WALKER, LAKOTA
SocmrY 23-34 (1992) (discussing the laws, leaders and administration of the
Lakota society). Chief Justice John Marshall described Indian nations' pre-Co-
lombian existence by noting that prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the
United States was occupied by, "a distinct people, divided into separate nations,
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of
their own, and governing themselves by their own laws." Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 542 (1832).
11. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546-549; see also In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498(1904) ("In the early dealings of the Government with the Indian tribes the lat-
ter were recognized as possessing some of the attributes of nations. .. ").
12. See, e.g., Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, reprinted in 2
CHARLEs J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAiRs, LAws AND TREATIES 3 (1904).
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other, otherwise than by securing the offender or offenders by impris-
onient, or any other competent means, till a fair and impartial trial
can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near as can be to the
laws, customs and usages of the contracting parties and natural jus-
tice: The mode of such trials to be hereafter fixed by the wise men of
the United States in Congress assembled, with the assistance of such
deputies of the Delaware nation, as may be appointed to act in concert
with them in adjusting this matter to their mutual liking.1 3
The United States Constitution reflected the notion that In-
dian nations remained outside the federal system by twice ex-
cluding "Indians not taxed" from apportionment in Congress, 14
and by empowering Congress to regulate commerce "with the In-
dian tribes," thus paralleling Congress's power over commerce
with foreign nations. 15 The express text of the Constitution rec-
ognizes the status of Indian tribes as separate sovereigns
outside the federal union.16 Indeed, the implicit reference to In-
dian treaties in the Supremacy Clause' 7 admits Indian tribes
among the ranks of those powers capable of making treaties,
reinforcing the separate sovereign status of Indian tribes. 8
The United States continued to treat with Indian tribes as
sovereign nations throughout the early and middle nineteenth
century. Some of these treaties, such as the 1868 Treaty with
the Sioux, explicitly provided for jurisprudential relations be-
tween the two sovereigns:
If bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to the
authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the per-
13. Id. at 4.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
15. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court noted the parallelism between
the Constitution's reference to Congress's power with foreign nations and with
Indian tribes in United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188,
197 (1876) ("[Tlhe power to make treaties with the Indian tribes is, as we have
seen, coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign nations.").
16. See supra note 14; see also Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the
Federal Union, 26 WmLA~mTTE L. Ray. 841, 846-847 (1990) (stating that the
language "Indians not taxed" in the Constitution accurately reflects the polit-
ical status of the Indian nations as a distinct entity from the federal union, and
that this status is what the Indian nations wanted).
17. U.S. CONsT. art VI. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id. (emphasis added).
18. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559-560 (1832) ("The constitution,
by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with
the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers
who are capable of making treaties.").
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son or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon proof made
to the agent and forwarded to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at
Washington City, proceed at once to cause the offender to be arrested
and punished according to the laws of the United States, and also re-
imburse the injured person for the loss sustained.
If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depreda-
tion upon the person or property of any one, white, black, or Indian,
subject to the authority of the United States, and at peace therewith,
the Indians herein named solemnly agree that they will, upon proof
made to their agent and notice by him, deliver up the wrong-doer to the
United States, to be tried and punished according to its laws.1 9
In 1871, Congress stopped treating with Indian nations and
shortly thereafter began to regulate the affairs of Indian na-
tions, both external and internal, by direct legislation.20 To af-
firm this direct regulatory relationship between Congress and
Indian nations, the Supreme Court developed the "plenary
power" doctrine, which vests Congress with virtually unlimited
authority to legislate concerning Indian affairs.21 The "plenary
power" doctrine produced a sort of "fit" for Indian nations within
the federal system-they were placed, albeit without consent,
under the direct control of Congress.
The overarching doctrine of "plenary power" did not provide
a general relationship between the federal government and the
Indian nations beyond justifying the means for Congress to de-
fine that relationship through legislation. More particularly,
"plenary power" and the placement of Indian nations within the
federal system left undefined the relationship of the judicial bod-
ies of the Indian nations to the federal judiciary.22 Congress has
never exercised its authority to provide a relationship or further
define one.
19. Treaty with the Sioux-Brul6, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai,
Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee-and Arap-
aho, Apr. 29, 1868, art. I, reprinted in 2 KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 998.
20. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. CXX, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
21. For discussions of the origin and nature of the "plenary power" doc-
trine, see Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest
for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 Apma L. REv. 77, 110-125 (1993); Neil
J. Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984); Comment, Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After
Weeks and Sioux Nation," 131 U. PA. L. REv. 235 (1982). Today, the Supreme
Court operates under the rule that "Congress has plenary authority to limit,
modify, or eliminate the powers of self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
22. Unfortunately, the "plenary power" doctrine is relatively useless as a
guide to defining that relationship. For a detailed discussion of the relation-
ship, see Clinton, supra note 16.
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Just as the Supreme Court supplied a basis for Congress's
authority over the internal governance of Indian nations when
none existed in the constitutional text, it has begun to establish
a relationship between the tribal and federal judiciaries in the
absence of textual definition. Early on, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized two important principles regarding the relationship be-
tween federal and tribal courts in Talton v. Mayes.23 The Court
held that the limitations of the United States Constitution do
not bind tribal courts exercising inherent sovereign powers be-
cause the Constitution was framed to govern the United
States-not Indian tribes.24 Furthermore, the Court held that
tribal courts are the final arbiters of tribal law, just as state
courts are the final arbiters of state law.
25
Later, in the wake of the civil rights movement, Congress
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") which selectively
imposed limitations on tribal governments similar to those
found in the United States Constitution.26 In Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court held that the primary
responsibility for enforcing the ICRA rests with the tribal courts
because Congress had expressed no contrary desire.27 The or-
ders of the tribal courts relative to the ICRA will be reviewed
only in habeas corpus cases where Congress has made express
provision for review. 28 In the same year, the Supreme Court de-
23. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). In Talton, the petitioner challenged the Cherokee
Nation's use of a five-person grand jury to obtain an indictment against him
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and under Cherokee Nation law.
Id. at 379. The Court ruled that the Nation's exercises of power were not "fed-
eral" so as to subject the Nation to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment, nor
were they "state power" so as to subject the Nation to the limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 381-82. The Court also ruled that the Cherokee
Nation court's interpretation of the Nation's laws binds the federal court. Id. at
384-85.
24. Id. at 384. This holding closely parallels pre-Fourteenth Amendment
holdings concerning the effect of the federal Constitution on state governments.
See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the fifth
amendment protection against taking private property for public use is a limi-
tation only on the United States government and not on the acts of the states).
25. Talton, 163 U.S. at 385.
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The history of the ICRA
is set forth in detail in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-72
(1978). The purpose of the ICRA is to ensure that Indian tribal governments
would not violate certain rights set forth in the Bill of Rights. Rather than
using the general language of the Fourteenth Amendment under which courts
have selectively applied certain Bill of Rights guarantees to the states, how-
ever, the ICRA expressly lists the rights that no tribal government shall
abridge. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
27. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
28. Id. at 70.
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cided in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that the "overrid-
ing" national interest of the United States divested Indian tribes
of inherent criminal authority over non-Indians.29
In National Farmers Union, however, the Court refused to
extend that analysis to civil cases involving non-Indians, ruling
instead that civil jurisdiction is divested only by express provi-
sion.30 Rather, in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual,
the Supreme Court created the exhaustion doctrine, apparently
beginning to refine the relationship between courts of the two
sovereigns.31
National Farmers Union arose out of a motor vehicle acci-
dent on state-owned school property on the Crow Indian Reser-
vation in Montana.32 The accident victim, a Crow Tribe
member, brought suit in tribal court against the school, seeking
money damages in tort.33 The school defaulted on the tribal
court action and the tribal court entered a money judgment
against the school.34 Upon receiving notice of the judgment, the
school's insurer challenged the tribal court's jurisdiction over
the suit by filing an action in federal court and seeking an in-
junction against the tribal court.35
The district court granted the insurer an injunction but the
Ninth Circuit reversed.3 6 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the in-
surer's claim did not arise under federal law and dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.37 In an unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's juris-
dictional ruling, holding that challenges to tribal court jurisdic-
tion arise under federal common law and thus present federal
questions.38 The Supreme Court also ruled that the analysis of
jurisdictional limitations that federal law places on tribal courts
"should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court
itself,"3 9 and that "exhaustion [of tribal court remedies] is re-
29. 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
30. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852
n.14. (1985).
31. Id. at 853-57; Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
32. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 847.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 847-48.
35. Id. at 848.
36. Id. at 848-49
37. Id. at 849.
38. Id. at 852.
39. Id. at 856.
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quired before such a claim may be entertained by a federal
court," thereby creating the exhaustion rule.40
The Court justified the exhaustion requirement by citing
three of the requirement's virtues. First, exhaustion furthers
the federal "policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-
determination."41 Second, exhaustion promotes the "orderly ad-
ministration of justice."42 Finally, exhaustion "provide[s] other
courts with the benefit of [tribal courts'] expertise in such [uris-
dictional] matters."43 At the same time, the Court also created
three exceptions to its new exhaustion rule "where an assertion
of tribal jurisdiction 'is motivated by a desire to harass or is con-
ducted in bad faith,'.., where the action is patently violative of
express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would
be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to chal-
lenge the court's jurisdiction."44
Two years later in Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court applied
the exhaustion requirement to a case brought under federal di-
versity jurisdiction.45 Iowa Mutual, like National Farmers
Union, arose out of a motor vehicle accident on a reservation.46
An Indian victim brought suit in tribal court against another In-
dian for damages in tort, and also against the tortfeasor's in-
surer for "bad faith refusal to settle."47 After the tribal trial
court ruled that the claims fell within the tribal court's subject
matter jurisdiction, but before that issue was appealed to the
tribal appellate court, the insurer filed suit in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction and sought a declaratory judgment
that the accident "fell outside the coverage of the applicable in-
surance policies."48 The insurer did not challenge the tribal
court's jurisdiction as part of its federal claims but merely
sought to litigate its defense in a parallel federal forum. The
district court dismissed the insurer's claim and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed on the strength of National Farmers Union.49
40. Id. at 857.
41. Id. at 856.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 857.
44. Id. at 856 n.21 (citation omitted). Coincidentally, the first two excep-
tions are the same exceptions the Court created in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
338 (1977), to the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
45. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1987).
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 13-14.
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The insurer made two arguments on appeal to the Supreme
Court. It sought first to distinguish National Farmers Union on
the ground that Iowa Mutual did not involve a challenge to the
tribal court's jurisdiction. 50 Next, the insurer argued that the
policies underlying federal diversity jurisdiction, namely, avoid-
ance of local prejudice to distant litigants, favored an exercise of
federal jurisdiction. 51 The Supreme Court rejected both conten-
tions.52 The Court's principle concern was that placing federal
courts in "competition" with tribal courts would impair tribal
courts' "authority over reservation affairs," thereby frustrating
the federal policy supporting tribal self-government.53 As a re-
sult, it found that exhaustion was required "[rlegardless of the
basis for [federal court] jurisdiction." 4 The Court found nothing
in the federal grant of diversity jurisdiction which overrode the
federal policy of supporting tribal sovereignty and no indication
that Congress intended to impair tribal authority when it en-
acted and re-enacted diversity jurisdiction statutes., 5 Finally, it
noted that the policy underlying federal diversity jurisdiction-
"protection against local bias and incompetence"-was "not
among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement" stated in
National Farmers Union.56
As a result of its analysis, the Supreme Court ruled that the
insurer "must exhaust available tribal remedies before institut-
ing suit in federal court."5 7 Ultimately, the tribal court's juris-
dictional ruling would be subject to federal review.58 If the
federal court determined that the tribal court had jurisdiction,
however, the claims could not be relitigated in federal court.5 9
Several aspects of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mu-
tual are noteworthy. Both federal suits were brought while tri-
bal court actions involving the same parties were already
pending.60 Both cases involved situations in which Indians sued
non-Indians in tribal court and the non-Indians counter-sued in
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. Id. at 18-19.
52. Id. at 16-19.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 18-19.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12-13; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 848-49.
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federal court.61 Moreover, the deference that federal courts ac-
corded tribal courts now exceeds the deference given to state
courts in at least one respect. Iowa Mutual deprives a litigant of
the ability to present a claim properly founded on diversity juris-
diction in the federal forum whenever concurrent tribal court ju-
risdiction exists over the same issue-a result that, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his separate opinion, would not occur in
instances of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction. 62 Finally, one
cannot read Iowa Mutual and avoid the notion that exhaustion
is required, because the Court repeatedly described the exhaus-
tion doctrine in mandatory terms.63
In National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, the Supreme
Court began to develop a style of "fit" for tribal courts in the
federal system in which tribal courts are not quite apart from
the larger system, but not quite within it either. As with other
newly-developed doctrines of law, lower courts have begun to ap-
ply the exhaustion requirement to new situations, and in doing
so, they have further refined it.
II. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT IN THE LOWER
COURTS: A CLEAR RULE IN SEARCH OF
CONFUSION?
Various lower courts have applied National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual to require that litigants exhaust their tribal
court remedies prior to filing in federal court. Several circuits
have applied a "bright line" rule requiring parties to exhaust tri-
bal remedies in all cases except those falling plainly within one
of the exceptions to exhaustion listed in National Farmers
Union. Other circuits have applied a "particularized inquiry" of
61. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 11-12; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at
847-48.
62. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Notably, however, Iowa Mutual's contemplated district court review of
the tribal court's jurisdictional ruling falls short of the treatment given to state
court rulings on federal jurisdictional questions. State court jurisdictional rul-
ings are reviewed only by appeal to the Supreme Court. Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106, 111 (1963). For criticism of this rule, see Clinton, supra note 16, at
874-75; Clinton, supra note 21, at 150; see also M. Allen Core, Tribal Sover-
eignty: Federal Court Review of Tribal Court Decisions-Judicial Intrusion
Into Tribal Sovereignty, 13 AM. INDIAN L. Ray. 175 (1988) (discussing how the
Court has mistakenly analogized the relationship between federal and state
courts to the relationship between federal and tribal courts).
63. The Court repeatedly notes that litigants are "requir[ed]" or "must" ex-
haust their remedies, and that federal courts "must stay their hands." 480 U.S.
at 16, 19. The Court also describes exhaustion as "required as a matter of com-
ity." Id. at 16 n.8 (emphasis added).
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the application of the policies underlying National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual to given cases. The "bright line" rule is
better because it has the advantages of clarity, economy, and
ease of application. More importantly, it adheres more closely to
the policies at the core of the Supreme Court's decisions.
A. EXHAUSnON IN THE TEN CIRCUIT
Of all the circuits, the Tenth Circuit has most enthusiasti-
cally embraced tribal court exhaustion. In every case in which
the parties properly raised exhaustion, and even in two in which
they did not, the Tenth Circuit required tribal court exhaus-
tion.64 Thus, the Tenth Circuit has developed a "bright line"
rule of requiring exhaustion in all cases but those in which one
of the National Farmers Union exceptions plainly applies.
The Tenth Circuit first applied Iowa Mutual in Brown v.
Washoe Housing Authority.6 5 In this case, a non-Indian con-
struction company sought damages from a tribal housing au-
thority for breach of contract.6 6 Unlike National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual, no tribal court action was pending between
the parties at any time during the federal proceedings. The
court considered this irrelevant, ruling that "the considerations
of comity relied on in Iowa Mutual require [the plaintiff] to ex-
haust its tribal remedies before a federal court will consider this
case."
67
In Smith v. Moffett, an Indian brought a civil rights claim in
federal court against both tribal and federal officials. 68 The
Tenth Circuit expressly rejected three attempts to distinguish
Iowa Mutual. The court reiterated its belief that the absence of
a pending tribal court action "[did] not diminish" the application
64. In one case, the Tenth Circuit decided whether a reservation had been
diminished without requiring the litigants to first exhaust tribal court reme-
dies. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1389 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1012 (1990). The court did so, however, only be-
cause the Tribe did not appeal the exhaustion question. Id. at 1422. The court
made clear that it was leaving open the question whether exhaustion was re-
quired before a federal court could decide whether reservation boundaries had
been altered, stating that "[resolution of this issue can await another day." Id.
Subsequently, the circuit ruled that courts could raise exhaustion sua sponte,
and that exhaustion was required regardless of whether a case arose on a reser-
vation. See discussion infra note 73 and accompanying text.
65. 835 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1988).
66. Id. at 1327-28.
67. Id. at 1328.
68. 947 F.2d 442, 443 (10th Cir. 1991).
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of the exhaustion doctrine.69 Then, the court refused to distin-
guish Iowa Mutual on the ground that the federal court action
involved non-Indian defendants, calling it "immaterial to this
analysis."70 Finally, the court extended Iowa Mutual and Na-
tional Farmers Union to cases in which federal court jurisdiction
is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 71 because it found "no congres-
sional intent to limit Indian jurisdiction" in § 1343.72
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in Smith ruled that federal
courts may raise the issue of tribal court exhaustion sua
sponte.73 The court reasoned that exhaustion does not stem
from the parties' interest in a tribal forum, but from inter-sover-
eign concerns as, endorsed by congressional and federal policy.74
As a result, federal courts should require exhaustion to satisfy
institutional concerns, notwithstanding the parties' lack of in-
terest in proceeding in the tribal forum. 75
The Tenth Circuit's most recent exhaustion decision, Bank
of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, involved an off-reser-
vation bank's federal interpleader action to determine rights in
an account utilized by an Indian tribe and the manager of its
bingo establishment. 76 The Tenth Circuit extended Iowa Mu-
tual to require exhaustion in cases in which federal court juris-
diction is based on the interpleader statute.7 7 The court also
rejected the bank's contention that exhaustion was not appropri-
69. Id. at 444.
70. Id.
71. Section 1343 provides for federal district court jurisdiction over cases
involving deprivations of civil rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
72. Smith, 947 F.2d at 444.
73. Id. at 445.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court distinguished its decision to raise exhaustion sua sponte
in Smith from its decision not to in Yazzie on the grounds that Smith involved
an "intra-reservation dispute[ I rather than [a] reservation boundary dis-
pute[ I." Id. at 445. This statement created some doubt as to whether exhaus-
tion is required when a case's nexus to a reservation is indirect or when a case
arises off a reservation. The Tenth Circuit laid those doubts to rest, however, in
Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, when it ruled that exhaustion was
appropriate in cases arising off a reservation. 972 F.2d 1166,' 1170 (10th Cir.
1992); see also infra text accompanying note 78. The Tenth Circuit thus ap-
pears to consider the nexus between a case and the reservation irrelevant to the
actual exhaustion analysis but relevant to a court's decision to raise exhaustion
sua sponte.
76. 972 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 1170. The interpleader was dismissed in accord with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335(a)(1) (1988). Section 1335 provides for federal district court jurisdiction
over interpleader actions involving more than $500.00 and when two or more of
the claimants to the disputed item or money are of diverse citizenship.
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ate because all of the bank's activities took place off the reserva-
tion, calling that contention a "jurisdictional argument [that]
should first be heard in tribal court."78 Finally, the court of ap-
peals narrowed the "bad faith" exception set forth in National
Farmers Union79 by directing the parties to litigate the bad faith
issue in tribal court in the first instance.80
Since 1987, the Tenth Circuit has never denied a request for
exhaustion. By so ruling, it has extended the exhaustion re-
quirements of Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union to ap-
ply when no tribal court action is pending between the parties;
when federal court jurisdiction is based on grounds besides fed-
eral question and diversity, regardless of whether the case
"arose" on a reservation; when an Indian plaintiff seeks a fed-
eral forum for claims against non-Indians; and sua sponte. The
Tenth Circuit has created a bright line rule of requiring exhaus-
tion in virtually every case that does not fall plainly within one
of the three exceptions set forth in National Farmers Union.8'
The circuit has resisted creating exceptions to its rule and re-
sisted particularizing its inquiry into matters of degree.82
78. Bank of Okla., 972 F.2d at 1170.
79. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
80. Bank of Okla., 972 F.2d at 1171.
81. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the three
exceptions).
82. Very shortly before this article went into final print, the Tenth Circuit
decided Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, No. 92-2141, 1993 WL 379514 (10th Cir. Sept. 29,
1993), which remained "subject to revision or withdrawal" as of the date of this
article.
The plaintiff in Texaco challenged the Navajo Nation's imposition of a sev-
erance tax on non-Indians engaged in pipeline activity outside the Nation's res-
ervation but within "Indian country" and under the Nation's control. Id. at *1;
see Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Conm'n, 992 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1993),
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. July 27, 1993) (No. 93-616) (de-
fining "Indian country"). The Tenth Circuit found that "National Farmers
Union... requires that appellants present their jurisdictional challenge to the
tribal court before pursuing action in federal district court." Texaco, 1993
WL 379514 at *3. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the panel ruled that be-
cause the case involved non-Indian activity outside the reservation, the district
court should have engaged in a particularized inquiry regarding the application
of the policies underlying National Farmers Union to the case before it. Id. As
a result, the panel vacated the district court decision and remanded for a partic-
ularized inquiry. Id. at *4. The panel, however, restated its loyalty to the
bright line rule for cases arising within reservations: "When the activity at is-
sue arises on the reservation ... we have characterized the tribal exhaustion
rule as 'an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by the
federal court.'" Id. at *3. In so doing, the panel created a bifurcated rule: the
bright line rule will apply to cases arising within reservations and a particular-
ized inquiry will apply to cases arising outside reservations.
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The Ninth Circuit, which has considered the most exhaus-
tion cases, has experienced a circular "evolution." The circuit
began by aggressively applying the exhaustion requirement and
then shifted to a search for exceptions. Most recently, the circuit
came full circle when it developed a clear rule requiring exhaus-
tion whenever a "colorable question" of tribal court jurisdiction
exists.
The Ninth Circuit's first post-Iowa Mutual exhaustion case
was Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.83 Wellman was a diversity
case in which an Indian contractor sued a non-Indian corpora-
tion for breach of a contract to perform work within a reserva-
tion.84 The Ninth Circuit ruled that exhaustion is required
whenever a case arises "in Indian territory" and cited the policy
The decision in Texaco is irreconcilable with the Tenth Circuit's earlier de-
cision in Bank of Oklahoma that the exhaustion requirement applies equally to
cases involving non-Indian conduct outside the reservation, see supra text ac-
companying note 78, a conclusion that the Ninth Circuit also reached en banc in
Stock West Corp. v. Taylor. 964 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Indeed,
both Bank of Oklahoma and Stock West H (en banc) presented more compelling
cases for avoiding exhaustion because the non-Indian conduct out of which
those cases arose was apparently outside "Indian country." Bank of Okla., 972
F.2d at 1170; Stock West II (en banc), 964 F.2d at 919-20. More importantly,
the distinction that the panel drew between "reservations" and "Indian country"
is plainly contrary to a consistent line of Supreme Court decisions holding that
"Indian country" is indistinguishable from reservations for purposes ofjurisdic-
tion and tribal sovereignty. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Pota-
watomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (stating that the test for determining
whether land is "Indian country" turns only on whether the land was "validly
set apart for the use of the Indians"); DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425,
446 (1975) (noting that off-reservation trust lands fall under "tribal and federal
jurisdiction"); see also Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1077 (discussing the ramifications
of land being within "Indian country"). In addition, the bifurcated rule will cre-
ate confusion in cases in which it is difficult to determine where a case "arose."
See, e.g., Stock West II (en banc), 964 F.2d at 919 (rejecting this test in a case
that arose out of conduct both on and off the reservation). Finally, the particu-
larized inquiry that the Tenth Circuit has suggested has inherent disadvan-
tages that favor use of a bright line rule in all cases. See discussion infra Part
H.F.2. One such disadvantage that the reasoning in Texaco exemplifies is that
the policy supporting tribal self-determination dictates that tribal forums deter-
mine the degree of tribal interest in a case, yet the panel in Texaco implicitly
determined-without input from the tribal forum-that the Nation's interest in
cases arising within its non-reservation "Indian country" areas is less than its
interest in reservation-based cases. Texaco, 1993 WL 379514, at *3. Hope-
fully, the Tenth Circuit will resolve the conflict between its panel decisions
(either by rehearing Texaco en banc or in a later case) in favor of applying the
bright line rule in all cases as did the Ninth Circuit in Stock West 11 (en banc).
83. 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 578.
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against competition between federal and tribal courts as the jus-
tification for its ruling.8 5 Like the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the absence of a pending tribal court suit is
irrelevant to its analysis.8 6 Wellman represented a clear state-
ment by the Ninth Circuit that exhaustion is required whenever
a case arose in "Indian country."
Within a year, however, the Ninth Circuit began creating
exceptions to its clear exhaustion requirement. In Alaska v. Na-
tive Village of Venetie, the village brought suit in tribal court to
enforce a tribal business tax against a local state school dis-
trict.8 7 The school district countersued in federal court, con-
tending that the village did not represent a sovereign Indian
tribe with taxation authority but was merely an unorganized ag-
gregation of individual Indians without sovereign status.88 The
federal panel held that no exhaustion was necessary, reasoning
that because the exhaustion requirement arose out of considera-
tions of tribal sovereignty and tribal-federal inter-sovereign re-
lations, the village's sovereign status must first be established.
8 9
The Ninth Circuit's next two exhaustion decisions, Stock
West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
("Stock West 1"),90 and Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet
Tribe ("Burlington Northern 1"),91 present confused analyses of
the exhaustion requirement. In Stock West I, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a district court order requiring exhaustion in a diversity
case that presented the same issues as a previously-filed tribal
court action.92 Because Stock West rs procedural posture was
virtually indistinguishable from Iowa Mutual's, the exhaustion
decision appeared unsurprising. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit
provided confusing dictum characterizing the exhaustion re-
quirement as a "discretionary exercise of the court's equity pow-
ers," which indicated that exhaustion is not mandatory but
rather a matter for district court discretion.93
Burlington Northern I involved a federal court challenge to
a tribal right-of-way tax by a railroad with tracks passing
85. Id. at 579.
86. Id. at 578.
87. 856 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1386.
89. Id. at 1388.
90. 873 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).
91. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
92. Stock West I, 873 F.2d at 1227.
93. Id. at 1229.
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through the reservation.94 The district court upheld a refusal to
require exhaustion, relying on its dictum in Stock West I:
[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion by reaching the merits.
Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873
F.2d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 1989) (prudential exhaustion subject to abuse
of discretion standard). The complaint presents issues of federal, not
tribal, law; no proceeding is pending in any tribal court; the tribal
court possesses no special expertise; and exhaustion would not have
assisted the district court in deciding federal law issues. Cf National
Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857, 105 S. Ct.
2447, 2454, 85 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1985). 95
The court ruled in favor of the tribe's power to regulate rail-
roads, so the exhaustion decision was of little import to the par-
ties before it. Indeed, given that the court dismissed some tribal
parties and granted summary judgment in favor of the rest,96
the exhaustion decision could be characterized as dictum. What
is inescapable, however, is that with Burlington Northern I, the
Ninth Circuit deemed exhaustion "prudential" and allowed a cir-
cumstantial evaluation based on the particularized application
of the policies underlying National Farmers Union to prevail.97
Four months later, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit de-
cided Burlington Northern R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council ("Bur-
lington Northern 117), a case involving nearly identical issues
and procedural posture as Burlington Northern L 98 After an un-
convincing attempt to harmonize its ruling with Stock West I
and Burlington Northern I, the Burlington Northern II panel
concluded that "[tihe requirement of exhaustion of tribal reme-
dies is not discretionary; it is mandatory. The district court had
no discretion to relieve [the plaintiff] from exhausting tribal
remedies prior to proceeding in federal court,"99 and that "[tihe
exhaustion requirement thus functions as a prerequisite to a
federal court's exercise of its jurisdiction." 00 The Burlington
Northern 11 panel rejected references to the very factors listed as
potentially determinative to avoiding exhaustion in Burlington
Northern P-01- Unlike the prior decision within the same circuit,
this panel found that the presence or absence of a pending tribal
94. Burlington Northern I, 924 F.2d at 901.
95. Id. at 901 n.2.
96. Id. at 900.
97. See supra text accompanying note 95.
98. 940 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 1245.
100. Id. at 1245 n.3.
101. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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court action presented a "distinction [that] falls of its own
weight.' 0 2
The Ninth Circuit sought to make another exception to the
mandatory exhaustion rule in Stock West, Inc. v. Taylor (Stock
West 1).103 In Stock West II, a non-Indian corporation brought a
diversity action against a non-Indian tribal attorney for legal
malpractice.10 4 The case arose out of an opinion letter that the
tribal attorney gave the corporation relating to contracts be-
tween the non-Indian corporation and tribal corporations.10 5
The attorney researched and drafted the opinion letter on the
reservation but delivered it to the non-Indian corporation off the
reservation.' 0 6 The panel ruled that exhaustion was unneces-
sary because the tribal attorney was not an Indian and because
the case "arose" at the off-reservation site of the letter's delivery,
thus categorizing the case as not "a reservation affair."' 07
The Ninth Circuit's next opinion, Crawford v. Genuine Parts
Co., involved a products liability action originally filed by Indian
plaintiffs in Montana state court.' 08 After the defendants re-
moved the action to federal court, the plaintiffs requested that
the district court "transfer the cases to the Blackfeet tribal
court," five years after originally filing the action in state
court.10 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit summarized its prece-
dent prior to Crawford by noting that the existence of tribal
court proceedings is "irrelevant"-0 and that "exhaustion of tri-
bal remedies is not discretionary; it is mandatory.""'- The panel
ruled that the parties must exhaust tribal remedies unless one
of the three exceptions set forth in National Farmers Union11:2
or the "non-reservation affair" exception set forth in Stock West
II applied. 1 3 The court ordered the parties to exhaust their tri-
bal remedies because the accident occurred on the reservation,
thus making it a "reservation affair," 1 4 and because the delay
102. Burlington Northern II, 940 F.2d at 1246.
103. 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 658.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 662.
107. Id. at 661.
108. 947 F.2d 1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992).
109. Id. at 1406-07.
110. Id. at 1407.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114. 947 F.2d at 1408.
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in requesting the transfer did not constitute "bad faith" under
National Farmers Union.115
The Ninth Circuit's next exhaustion case, United States v.
Plainbull, involved an action by the United States to collect
fines for illegal grazing on trust land held by the federal govern-
ment for the benefit of the tribe.116 Federal jurisdiction was
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1355, which reads: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforce-
ment of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
incurred under any Act of Congress ... "-17 Notwithstanding
§ 1355's apparent grant of exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts, the Plainbull court upheld an order dismissing the case
on exhaustion grounds. 118 The court ruled that § 1355's grant of
federal jurisdiction is exclusive of state courts only, because the
statutory language is not sufficiently directed at tribal sover-
eignty to overcome the presumption of tribal court jurisdiction
over reservation affairs.119  Despite the case's outcome,
Plainbull presents a troubling turn for the Ninth Circuit. Be-
cause the panel reverted to describing exhaustion as "discretion-
ary,"1 20 the court left in doubt once again whether the Ninth
Circuit considered exhaustion mandatory or discretionary.
Perhaps to resolve these doubts, the Ninth Circuit decided
to review Stock West II en banc to resolve the scope of the ex-
haustion requirement within the circuit.121 At first, the en banc
opinion appears to revert to the "discretionary" analysis found in
Stock West I and Burlington Northern I, describing the question
presented as "whether the district court abused its discretion" 22
and stating that the "decision to abstain 'involves a discretion-
ary exercise of a court's equity powers.'" 123 The Ninth Circuit
concluded, however, that the lower court properly required ex-
haustion "because colorable questions are presented in this civil
action regarding whether the Colville Tribal Courts have con-
current jurisdiction over alleged tortious conduct that may have
115. Id.
116. 957 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1992).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1988).
118. 957 F.2d at 726-27.
119. Id. at 726-28.
120. See, e.g., id. at 726 (framing the question so it would "determine
whether the district court abused its discretion by electing to abstain") (empha-
sis added).
121. Stock West Co. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
122. Id. at 913-14.
123. Id. at 917 (quoting Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964)).
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commenced on the reservation. Under such circumstances, the
district court is required to abstain."124
Stock West 11 (en banc) is an important decision for the Cir-
cuit because it established a clear rule that requires exhaustion
whenever a "colorable" assertion that a tribal court could have
jurisdiction over a claim exists. Stock West II (en banc) also is
important because it established a separate basis for tribal court
exhaustion. The tribal attorney raised tribal sovereign immu-
nity as a defense and relied on provisions in the Colville Tribal
Code which extend immunity to tribal officials. 125 The Ninth
Circuit ruled that "[b]ecause the question whether a defendant
is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity requires an
interpretation of tribal law under the facts set forth in the pres-
ent record, the Colville Tribal Courts must decide that question
in the first instance." 126 In other words, the Ninth Circuit devel-
oped a form of Pullman abstention, 27 requiring tribal law ques-
tions to be decided first by tribal courts.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit has travelled full circle from
its open acceptance of the exhaustion doctrine in Wellman, to its
search for exceptions in Native Village of Venetie, Stock West I,
Burlington Northern I, and Stock West II, to its renewed deter-
mination in Stock West II (en banc) to make exhaustion
mandatory and not subject to exceptions based on the degree of
tribal or reservation relation to the case. Like the Tenth Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit has now considered the existence of a pending
tribal court action irrelevant, extended exhaustion beyond fed-
eral question and diversity cases, rejected a rule requiring
courts to analyze the particular degree of nexus between the
case and the reservation or the tribe's interest in the dispute,
and considered the tribal membership of the parties irrelevant.
124. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). By "colorable questions," the Ninth Cir-
cuit meant that "on the record before us, the assertion of tribal court jurisdic-
tion is plausible and appears to have a valid or genuine basis." Id. at 919. Of
course, this appears to be no more than a restatement of National Farmers
Union's "patently violative" of jurisdictional prohibitions exception. See supra
note 44 and accompanying text.
125. Stock West II (en banc), 964 F.2d at 920.
126. Id.
127. A Pullman abstention requires federal courts, faced with a constitu-
tional issue that might be resolved or avoided by an interpretation of state law,
to abstain and allow state courts to interpret state law in the first instance. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Stock West II similarly
provides that when a case can be resolved by an interpretation of tribal law, the
case should be referred to tribal court for that interpretation, at least in the
first instance. Stock West, Inc. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991).
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C. EXHAUSTION IN THE EIGHTH CiRcurr
Like the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit has
ruled that the prior existence of a tribal court action is not a
prerequisite for exhaustion. Unlike the Tenth and Ninth Cir-
cuits, however, the Eighth Circuit has not resolved many ex-
haustion issues so clearly. Perhaps as a result of this lack of
authority, district courts within the Eighth Circuit are now carv-
ing out exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Most notably,
the Eighth Circuit seems close to developing its own exception to
the exhaustion requirement when it finds that statutes of gen-
eral application limit tribal court jurisdiction.
1. Court of Appeals Decisions
The Eighth Circuit decided Weeks Construction, Inc. v.
Oglala Sioux Housing Authority prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Iowa Mutual.128 Weeks Construction was a diversity
action filed by a non-Indian contractor against a tribal housing
authority for breach of a contract to perform construction work
on the reservation. 129 The Eighth Circuit declined to reach the
issue of whether diversity jurisdiction existed,130 finding that
exercising federal diversity jurisdiction over a dispute that
"arose on the reservation and raises questions of tribal law in-
terpretation"13 1 would "impinge on the tribe's right to self-gov-
ernment"132 and undermine the authority of tribal courts. 33
Anticipating Iowa Mutual's desire to avoid competition between
federal and tribal courts, the Eighth Circuit ruled that absten-
tion was proper.' 34
Shortly after Iowa Mutual, the Eighth Circuit decided
United States ex rel. Kishell v. Thrtle Mountain Housing Author-
ity.1 5 In Kishell, the Eighth Circuit applied Iowa Mutual to a
case in which no tribal court action was pending, finding "that
the policy of initially deferring to the tribal court is equally ap-
plicable" in such cases. 136 The Eighth Circuit found exhaustion
128. Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.
1986).
129. Id. at 670.
130. Id. at 672-74.
131. Id. at 673.
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id. at 673-4.
134. Id.
135. 816 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 1276.
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"especially appropriate"13 7 because Kishell involved a dispute
between a tribe member and a tribal agency that was conducting
"quasi-governmental activities on land situated entirely within
the reservation's borders."138 The court found that such a situa-
tion is a "purely internal tribal controversy, which the tribal
court is uniquely situated to resolve."' 3 9
The Eighth Circuit's adherence to a mandatory exhaustion
rule, however, soon wavered. In Greywater v. Joshua, the court
refused to extend the exhaustion doctrine to challenges of tribal
court criminal actions brought under the ICRA's grant of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction. 140 Relying on the Supreme Court's
holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,14 ' and a
lengthy discussion in National Farmers Union concerning the
differences between tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction, 14 2 the
Eighth Circuit ruled that exhaustion was not required "in a
criminal case where the ultimate sentence may exceed one year
imprisonment." 143
Again in Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs,14 4 the Eighth Circuit did not require exhaustion in a case
brought by a tribal member against his tribe and federal govern-
ment agencies under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA7). 14 5 Relying on the language in § 6972 of RCRA,
that "[any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall
be brought in the district court for the district in which the al-
leged violation occurred," 46 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
federal courts provide an exclusive forum for suits brought
under the statute.' 47
The Eighth Circuit failed, however, to articulate why the
tribal court should not have been given the first opportunity to
determine whether § 6972 limited tribal court jurisdiction, as




140. 846 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1988). Specifically, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 pro-
vides that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe."
141. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 488 (citing 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
142. Id. at 488-89.
143. Id. at 488.
144. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 1097-98; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
147. Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1098.
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amounts to an "express jurisdictional limitation" of which tribal
court jurisdiction would be "patently violative" within the mean-
ing of the National Farmers Union exception.148 The court in
Blue Legs, however, did not apply that logic in its decision.
The Eighth Circuit's next exhaustion decision, DeMent v.
Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, involved a non-Indian's federal
habeas corpus challenge of tribal court custody orders involving
his child who resided on the reservation.149 The Eighth Circuit
required exhaustion,' 50 an unsurprising result given that De-
Ment involved a direct challenge to a tribal court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a pending case, 151 which placed the case
squarely under National Farmers Union. DeMent makes clear,
however, that Greywater did not create an exception to exhaus-
tion for all habeas cases, but rather that the ruling rests entirely
on the civil-criminal distinction. 152
The following year, the Eighth Circuit decided Twin City
Construction Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans.'53 Turtle Mountain represents a tortured procedural case
that began when an Indian filed a contract claim against a non-
Indian corporation in tribal court.'5 4 After the tribal court de-
termined that it had jurisdiction over the defendant corporation,
the defendant brought suit in federal court relying on National
Farmers Union to test the tribal court's jurisdictional ruling.' 55
The district court found that the tribe's own code prohibited the
tribal court from exercising jurisdiction, 156 overruling the tribal
court's interpretation of its own tribal law. On appeal, a divided
Eighth Circuit panel reversed, ruling that tribal courts' inter-
pretations of tribal law bind federal courts and that tribal court
jurisdiction was acceptable as a matter of federal law.157 The
dissent argued that both tribal and federal law barred tribal
court jurisdiction. 158 On en banc rehearing, the Eighth Circuit
148. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
149. 874 F.2d 510, 511-12 (8th Cir. 1989).
150. Id. at 516-17.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 515.
153. 911 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1990).
154. Id. at 138.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. For a description of the original panel decision and dissent in Tur-
tle Mountain, see S. Caroline Malone, Tribal Power Over Non-Indians: Tribal
Courts at a Civil Crossroads; Twin City Construction Company v. Turtle Moun-
tain Band of Chippewa Indians," 42 Aru. L. REv. 1027, 1047-1051 (1989).
158. Malone, supra note 157, at 1048-1050.
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affirmed the district court's ruling by an equally divided panel
without issuing an opinion. s59 The split decision and absence of
an opinion in Turtle Mountain left litigants without a clear un-
derstanding of how the Eighth Circuit would analyze jurisdic-
tional issues.
Subsequently, the tribe revised its code to eliminate the per-
ceived jurisdictional impediment and sought to dissolve the fed-
eral injunction against the tribal court action.160 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit dissolved the injunction so that the case could
proceed in tribal court.161 Without citing National Farmers
Union or Iowa Mutual, the panel found that exhaustion was
necessary:
In directing that the action should proceed [in tribal court], we are not
determining that the tribal court does have jurisdiction. We are sim-
ply directing that all issues of jurisdiction resulting from the pending
action should now be considered under the amended tribal code in the
appropriate forum or forums.
162
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit decided Northern States
Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Commu-
nity, in which a nuclear power producer challenged a tribal ordi-
nance regulating the transport of nuclear waste across the
reservation.163 The plaintiff argued that the Hazardous Materi-
als Transportation Act ("HMTA7),-64 which expressly preempts
tribal ordinances if they "create[ ] an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution" of the Act,' 65 preempted the tribal ordi-
nance at issue.166 The Eighth Circuit analyzed the effect of the
tribal ordinance and concluded that it was preempted. 167 The
Eighth Circuit failed to articulate a reason why the tribal court
should not have had the first opportunity to consider whether
the Act limited the tribe's power-other than the circular con-
clusion that exhaustion was not required because the Eighth
Circuit considered the tribal ordinance preempted. 168
159. Twin City Const. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,
866 F.2d 971, 972 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989). For a
criticism of the divided court result and the bases therefor, see Malone, supra
note 157, at 1050-51.
160. Turtle Mountain, 911 F.2d at 139.
161. Id. at 139-40.
162. Id.
163. 991 F.2d 458, 459 (8th Cir. 1993).
164. 49 U.S.C.A_ app. §§ 1801-1819 (West Supp. 1993).
165. 49 U.S.C_. app. § 1811 (a)(2).
166. 991 F.2d at 460.
167. Id. at 462.
168. Id. at 462-63.
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2. LOWER COURT ACTIONS
The United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota has begun to create exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement beyond those set forth in National Farmers Union.
For example, in Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing
Corp., an Indian brought claims based on age and race discrimi-
nation and breach of contract against his employer, a tribal cor-
poration. 169 The district court found that no exhaustion was
necessary. 170 The court distinguished Iowa Mutual and Na-
tional Farmers Union on the ground that no action was pending
in tribal court,171 ignoring Kishell's admonition that exhaustion
is "equally applicable" in such cases.'7 2 The court also distin-
guished Weeks Construction because it involved questions of tri-
bal law, although the breach of contract claim in Myrick
presumably arose under tribal law.' 73 Finally, the court distin-
guished Kishell by reasoning that the defendants in Kishell
"were agencies created by the tribes and the issues [in Kishell]
were primarily intra-tribal," 74 although the employment rela-
tion at issue in Myrick between tribal corporation and tribal
member governing work on the reservation was clearly an inter-
nal tribal matter.'7 5 The district court simply concluded that
"[tihe present case does not fit within any of the cases cited" be-
cause there is no attack on the jurisdiction of the tribal court,
the tribe is not a party, and the case "predominately presents
issues of federal law."176
In short, the district court did not require exhaustion in
Myrick because the case did not fall precisely within the holding
of any Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit case in every conceiva-
ble particular, notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit's clear state-
ments and the actual facts of the case before it. In so doing, the
169. 718 F. Supp. 753, 753 (D.N.D. 1989).
170. Id. at 755.
171. Id. at 754-55.
172. United States ex rel. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d
1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987).
173. Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 755.
174. Id.
175. The issues in Myrick were probably even more "internal" than the situ-
ation presented in Kishell, because Kishell involved questions of ownership and
use of trust land in which the United States had an interest. Kishell, 816 F.2d
at 1274. Indeed, the United States was a party in Kishell, id., whereas only a
tribal member and a corporation were parties in Myrick. 718 F. Supp. at 755.
176. Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 755.
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district court relied on distinctions that each had been expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit.1 77
Another North Dakota district court found exhaustion un-
necessary in Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation, in which non-Indian plaintiffs chal-
lenged the tribe's imposition of oil and gas severance taxes on
their mining operations on allotted lands within the reserva-
tion.178 The court found that exhaustion was not necessary,
after a flippant discussion in which the district court relied on
the overruled panel opinion in Stock West I!' 79 and mischar-
acterized Weeks Construction as involving "internal tribal
disputes."8 0 Displaying a poor understanding of English vocab-
ulary, the court stated that "this is not a case where tribaljuris-
diction is challenged, but a case where the power of the tribe to
excise a severance tax is challenged."' 8 ' Because the case did
not involve a "purely internal tribal controversy," the court
found no exhaustion necessary.'8 2 In so doing, it failed to recog-
nize that the challenge to the tribe's taxation authority neces-
sarily challenged the tribal court's adjudicatory authority over
taxation matters, which placed the case squarely under Na-
tional Farmers Union.
In summary, the Eighth Circuit has joined the Tenth and
Ninth Circuits in holding that the existence of a pending tribal
court action and the presence of non-Indian parties have no
bearing on the issue of exhaustion. The Eighth Circuit is
unique, however, because of the degree to which some district
courts have avoided applying the exhaustion doctrine by search-
ing for exceptions to appellate holdings based on the particular
177. The district court in Myrick may have converted the circumstances that
made Kishell "especially appropriate" for exhaustion, Kishell, 816 F.2d at 1276,
into an affirmative limitation of the exhaustion requirement when those factors
are not present. On the contrary, however, it is clear from Kishell that the
Eighth Circuit was not attempting to restrict the exhaustion requirement by
listing those factors. See id. (recognizing the "federal government's longstand-
ing policy of encouraging tribal self-government;" and suggesting that plaintiffs
should be required to exhaust tribal remedies so as not to "impair the authority
of the tribal courts").
178. 812 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-09 (D.N.D. 1992).
179. Id. at 1011.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added). Generally, 'jurisdiction" means the
"[a]uthority of a sovereign power to govern or legislate; power or right to exer-
cise authority; control." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d
1202, 1206 n.15 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1347 (2d ed. 1957) (unabridged)).
182. Duncan Energy, 812 F. Supp. at 1012.
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cases before them. In addition, the outcomes in Blue Legs and
Northern States Power indicate the emergence of a separate ex-
ception to exhaustion in cases in which the tribe's jurisdiction is
arguably limited by a statute of general application, as opposed
to limitations found in treaties or federal common law.
D. EXHAUSTION IN TrE SEVENTH Cmcurr
The Seventh Circuit became the fourth court of appeals to
consider an exhaustion case with its recent decision in Altheimer
& Gray v. Sioux Manufacturing Corp.'8 3 Altheimer arose out of
a dispute over the validity of a consulting contract between a
tribally-owned corporation and a non-Indian corporation.'
84
The case focused on whether the contract required the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior under 25 U.S.C. § 81 and
whether the tribe's sovereign immunity barred the action. 18 5
The contract clearly related to reservation affairs because it pro-
vided for an arrangement in which the non-Indian corporation
would help the tribal corporation manufacture latex medical
products on the reservation. 8 6 The contract, however, con-
tained choice of law and choice of forum clauses, which provided
that Illinois law would govern contract interpretation and that
state or federal courts in Illinois would resolve all disputes.'
8 7
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by focusing on the
absence of a pending tribal court action and misreading Iowa
Mutual. The court stated that Iowa Mutual "dealt only with the
situation where a tribal court's jurisdiction over a dispute has
been challenged by a later-filed action in federal court."' 88 The
Seventh Circuit nonetheless acknowledged that the policies un-
derlying the exhaustion requirement extend beyond cases in
which a tribal court action is pending or tribal court jurisdiction
is challenged per se.'8 9 Yet, rather than choose the bright-line
rules that the Tenth and Ninth Circuits use,190 and that the
Eighth Circuit apparently uses,19 ' the Seventh Circuit found it
"necessary to examine the factual circumstances of each case...
to determine whether the issue in dispute is truly a reservation
183. 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993).
184. Id. at 806.
185. Id. at 808, 812.
186. Id. at 806.
187. Id. at 807.
188. Id. at 814.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 128-168 and accompanying text.
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affair," citing Burlington Northern II.192 In other words, the
court chose the test that was examined and rejected by the same
courts it purported to follow.
The Seventh Circuit found that Altheimer involved primar-
ily issues of Illinois and federal law,193 ignoring the fact that it
had interpreted the tribe's code only two pages earlier to resolve
the sovereign immunity issue.194 The Seventh Circuit mani-
fested discomfort with this reasoning, noting that the "interpre-
tation of another jurisdiction's laws, however, does not alone
foreclose application of the tribal exhaustion rule."' 95 Lacking a
better basis, the Seventh Circuit justified its decision not to re-
quire exhaustion on its belief that exhaustion would "undercut
the Tribe's self-government and self-determination" because the
tribe had contracted to refer disputes to Illinois courts.' 96
Rather than characterize the choice of forum provision as an act
of self-determination that the court was bound to follow, or as a
jurisdictional limitation that satisfied an exception to the ex-
haustion requirement, the panel instead based its decision on its
own belief concerning where the tribe's best interests lay: "If
contracting parties cannot trust the validity of choice of law and
venue provisions, [the tribal corporation] may well find itself un-
able to compete and the Tribe's efforts to improve the reserva-
tion's economy may come to naught."197 In other words, the
Seventh Circuit decided for itself what was best for the tribe,
rejected the tribe's own determination of where best to litigate,
and imposed its determination on the tribe-all in the name of
promoting the tribe's self-determination.
E. EXHAUSTION IN OTHER FEDERAL COURTS
Lower courts in two other circuits have also required adher-
ence to the exhaustion doctrine. In Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida considered whether exhaustion
was appropriate in a dispute over a contract between the tribe
and the manager of its gaming operations. 198 The court ruled
that exhaustion was appropriate, which is an unsurprising re-
sult considering that the case clearly arose on the reservation,
192. Altheimer, 983 F.2d at 814.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 812.
195. Id. at 814.
196. Id. at 815.
197. Id.
198. 788 F. Supp. 566, 567 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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involved the tribe as a party, and an action arising out of the
same transaction was pending in tribal court.199 It is notewor-
thy, however, that the contract included terms providing that
the district court shall have jurisdiction over the suit.20 0
Notwithstanding the contractual terms, the court required ex-
haustion in order to give the tribal court the first opportunity to
review its jurisdiction. 201 The Florida court found that course
appropriate under Iowa Mutual and under the federal Indian
gaming laws,202 that were intended to strengthen tribal
governments. 20 3
In Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina consid-
ered whether exhaustion is required in a dispute between a
gaming manager and a slot machine lessor.20 4 The court held
that exhaustion was proper even though no action between the
parties was pending in tribal court and neither party was an
Indian or tribal official.205 The court did so because the case
arose on tribal lands, relying on Iowa Mutual, Stock West II, and
Tamiami Partners.20 6
F. SuMMARY AND ANALYsIs
The positions of the courts in the federal circuits that have
ruled on exhaustion clearly conflict. The Tenth and Ninth Cir-
cuits have developed clear rules requiring exhaustion in nearly
all cases in which it is requested, excepting only cases in which
the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is patently violative of
jurisdictional limitations.20 7 The Seventh Circuit and district
courts within the Eighth Circuit, however, have chosen to ex-
amine the particular circumstances of each case to determine
199. Id.
200. Id. at 568. The contract provided that the tribe waived its sovereign
immunity, and that the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida would have jurisdiction. Id.
201. Id. at 569.
202. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
203. 788 F. Supp. at 569; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2702. The Eleventh Circuit
subsequently dismissed Tamiami Partners for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, because it found that the plaintiff had not actually set forth allegations in
its complaint to state a claim under National Farmers Union. Tamiami Part-
ners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 999 F.2d 503, 508 (1993).
204. 816 F. Supp. 403, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
205. Id. at 407.
206. Id. at 406-07.
207. See supra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
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whether exhaustion would further the policies set forth in Na-
tional Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
208
The courts that have chosen the particularized test have de-
cided that the absence of a pending tribal court action presents a
potential distinction between the cases before them and Iowa
Mutual. Indeed, the absence of a tribal court action is the pri-
mary factor that allowed those courts to distinguish Iowa Mu-
tual and National Farmers Union.20 9 The courts of appeals of
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have expressly rejected
that distinction. Choosing between the rules developed in the
conflict among the circuits requires a two-fold analysis. One
must consider whether the existence of a pending tribal court
action constitutes a meaningful distinction, and also whether
the particularized inquiry is preferable to a bright line rule. In
addition, the Eighth Circuit's rulings in Blue Legs and Northern
States Power raise the separate question of whether exhaustion
is necessary when a tribe's jurisdiction arguably may be limited
by a statute of general application.
1. The Relevance of a Pending Tribal Court Action
The absence of a pending tribal court action provides a basis
for courts to make a case for avoiding the stare decisis effect of
Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union. Although the courts
utilizing the particularized inquiry have never clearly stated
their rationale, they appear to rely on the Supreme Court's ad-
monition: "[w]hen a Federal court is properly appealed to in a
case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take
such jurisdiction .... The right of a party plaintiff to choose a
Federal court where there is a choice cannot properly be
denied."210
This principle is subject to the limitations that the Supreme
Court has set forth through the development of abstention doc-
trines. As a normal rule, however, abstention is considered "an
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."211 As a re-
sult, courts must reason that the duty to accept jurisdiction is
firm and exceptions must be narrowly construed. Because Iowa
208. See supra notes 128-182 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th
Cir. 1993) (noting that in this case there was "no direct attack on a tribal court's
jurisdiction.... [and] no case pending in tribal court.... ")
210. New Orleans Public Serv. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-
59 (1989) (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
211. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
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Mutual and National Farmers Union are exceptions, the argu-
ment would follow, they too must be limited to their barest stare
decisis requirements.
This argument fails in its premise because it is based on an
excessively narrow view of the stare decisis effect of Iowa Mu-
tual. The rule announced in Iowa Mutual extends beyond situa-
tions in which a tribal court action is already pending, because
the Court expressly stated that "petitioner must exhaust avail-
able tribal remedies before instituting suit in federal court."212
The Supreme Court's ratio decidendi was the need to avoid "di-
rect competition with the tribal courts."213 That competition
will exist whenever a federal court exercises concurrent jurisdic-
tion over a matter within the tribal court's jurisdiction, regard-
less of whether an action is already pending, because the federal
court will compete with the tribal court for control over reserva-
tion affairs. Further evidence to support this reading of Iowa
Mutual comes from the Court's own characterization of the ques-
tion presented, which was, "whether a federal court may exer-
cise diversity jurisdiction before a tribal court system has an
opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."214 Notably ab-
sent from the Court's framing of the issue, however, is the men-
tion of the existence of a pending tribal court action.
Limiting Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union to their
facts would frustrate their purposes. Due to the degree that fed-
eral law controls reservation affairs, and the fact that disputes
over tribal court jurisdiction always present federal questions, a
vast percentage of cases ordinarily within tribal court jurisdic-
tion are also litigable in federal court.215 Limiting Iowa Mutual
and National Farmers Union to their facts could virtually elimi-
nate tribal court authority over reservation affairs by allowing
cases such as these to proceed in the federal forum. No court
212. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1986).
213. Id. at 16.
214. Id. at 11.
215. See, e.g., Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 810-11
(7th Cir. 1993) (illustrating how virtually any contract into which an Indian
tribe enters could create a federal question under 25 U.S.C. § 81); see also Chil-
kat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling that
claims for enforcement of tribal ordinance against a non-Indian defendant
presents a "federal question" which is litigable in federal court). These rulings
establish that virtually any contract into which a tribe enters and all disputes
about the applicability of tribal ordinances are litigable in federal court absent
an exhaustion requirement. For a discussion of the effect of decisions such as
Chilkat on tribal court authority, see Julie A. Pace, Comment, Enforcement of
Tribal Law in Federal Court:Affirmation of Indian Sovereignty or a Step Back-
wards Towards Assimilation, 24 ARIz. ST. L. J. 435, 459-467 (1992).
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has articulated a defensible reason why the goals of Iowa Mu-
tual and National Farmers Union should be frustrated when-
ever the proponent of federal jurisdiction simply wins "the race
to the courthouse." If a litigant cannot defeat the purpose of
Iowa Mutual by filing after the tribal court action begins, a liti-
gant should not be able to do so by filing earlier. This distinction
is merely temporal and bears no relation to the rationale or
analysis of Iowa Mutual.
Arguably, the presence of a tribal court action may appear
relevant because in such cases the federal court would interfere
with the tribal court's management of a particular case. This
infringement upon tribal authority may seem greater than in
cases in which no action is pending. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, articulated a broader rationale in Iowa Mutual, concluding
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction interferes with tribal
court "authority over reservation affairs" and "tribal lawmaking
authority." 216 The Court thus sought to avoid infringement on
tribal court authority over its own tribal laws and reservation,
not simply the management of individual cases.
In addition to the policies set forth in Iowa Mutual and Na-
tional Farmers Union, considerations of ripeness and standing
that underlie abstention doctrines favor exhaustion prior to the
initiation of a federal court action. Many of the cases raising
exhaustion involve questions of tribal regulatory and adjudica-
tory authority over non-Indians on reservations.217 Until en-
forcement is sought through tribal forums, the threat of tribal
assertions of jurisdiction remains uncertain enough to raise
standing concerns. Similarly, the federal court can have no
more than theoretical bases for its decision unless and until the
manner in which tribal jurisdiction is exercised over a particular
person is established by enforcement in the tribal forum. Only
after the fact, manner, and means of enforcement are estab-
lished does the case present a ripe controversy. 218
216. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.
217. At least five of the exhaustion cases involve such questions. See Bur-
lington Northern R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1240 (9th Cir.
1991) (Burlington Northern II); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe,
924 F.2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1991) (Burlington Northern I); Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988); Superior Oil Co. v.
United States, 798 F.2d 1324, 1325 (10th Cir. 1986) (pre-Iowa Mutual); Duncan
Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 812 F.
Supp. 1009, 1010 (D.N.D. 1992).
218. For this reason, the Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern II rejected an
attempt to limit Iowa Mutual to cases in which a tribal court action was pend-
ing. 940 F.2d at 1246.
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2. The Bright Line Rule vs. The Particularized Inquiry
Numerous considerations favor the Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits' bright line rule over the particularized inquiry that the
Seventh Circuit recently adopted. Most notably, the rule is eas-
ily understandable by potential litigants, thereby eliminating
doubts about the proper forum in which to pursue litigation and
when and where to raise the exhaustion issue. This clarity, in
turn, helps to eliminate unnecessary preparation and presenta-
tion of cases to the federal forum, conserving judicial and eco-
nomic resources.
The particularized inquiry requires parties to devote sub-
stantial effort to litigating in federal forums to develop the fac-
tual predicates for the application of the National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual policies, only to find themselves cast out
of the federal forum in which they have devoted so much effort
(and which has devoted so much effort to them). Indeed, consid-
eration of such issues as whether the case presents "a reserva-
tion affair" will not always lend itself to resolution by simple
review of the complaint and may require significant factual de-
velopment through affidavits or evidentiary hearings.
It is significant that the two circuits that have examined the
issue most closely have adopted bright line rules. 219 The Ninth
Circuit's experience is particularly instructive. The Ninth Cir-
cuit struggled to develop exceptions and prudential considera-
tions to govern the particularized inquiries. 220 Frustrated with
the difficulties of degree that cases such as Stock West II present
and the lack of principled bases for distinction between cases,
the Ninth Circuit avoided the difficulties by simply eliminating
the inquiry.
Indeed, courts that have tried to develop principled reasons
to avoid exhaustion in cases that may be within tribal court ju-
risdiction have failed to articulate meaningful and logical bases
for distinction. These courts have been forced to resort to logic
like the court in Duncan Energy, when it reasoned that the case
before it did not involve "tribal jurisdiction" but merely "the
power of the tribe."221 Worse yet, the court in Myrick concluded
219. See supra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing Stock West H (en
banc)).
221. See Duncan Energy, 812 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
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that an employment relationship between a tribal member and a
tribal corporation is not an internal tribal affair.222
The Seventh Circuit's consideration of Altheimer is also in-
structive. One factor that the court cited as weighing against
exhaustion was that the case involved applications of federal
law which were "distant" to the tribal court.223 National Farm-
ers Union, however, directs federal courts to refer federal law
questions to tribal courts. 224 Apparently uncomfortable with its
own rationale, the court in Altheimer belittled the rationale im-
mediately after articulating it.225 The only other factor that the
court cited was its own consideration of the tribe's interests. 226
In so doing, however, the court defeated the very goals of tribal
self-determination to which it appealed and purported to pro-
mote. In short, the Seventh Circuit failed to articulate any
meaningful reason why Iowa Mutual and National Farmers
Union did not require it to refer the validity of the contract and
the application of the choice of forum clause to the tribal court
for initial determination. Certainly the tribal court occupies the
best position for judging whether the tribe's interests mandate
enforcement of the clause.
The principal reason to avoid the particularized inquiry,
however, is that the inquiry itself defeats the policies underlying
Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union. The particularized
inquiry requires federal courts to examine whether the case
before it involves a "reservation affair" or an "important tribal
interest" as part of a balancing test.22 7 Tribal self-determina-
tion, however, requires that the identification of important tri-
bal interests or matters sufficiently connected to the reservation
to warrant tribal court resolution occur within tribal forums. In-
deed, the importance of a matter to the tribe or its nexus to the
reservation is an issue particularly within the tribal courts' ex-
pertise. National Farmers Union teaches that federal courts
222. Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D.N.D.
1989).
223. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814 (7th Cir.
1993).
224. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
225. Altheimer, 983 F.2d at 814-15; see also supra notes 193-197 and accom-
panying text (analyzing the Court's decision-making process).
226. Altheimer, 983 F.2d at 815.
227. See, e.g., id. at 811 (stating that it is "necessary to examine the factual
circumstances of each case .... in order to determine whether the issue in
dispute is truly a reservation affair entitled to the exhaustion doctrine.").
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should take advantage of that expertise when it is available
through exhaustion.2 28
The particularized inquiry necessarily leads to the "in-
fringe[ment] upon tribal law-making authority" that the
Supreme Court condemned and sought to avoid in Iowa Mu-
tual.229 The inquiry causes this harm in two ways. First, the
inquiry often leads federal courts to examine and interpret tri-
bal laws in the first instance-either to determine whether the
matter falls within the tribe's declared interests as part of the
inquiry itself,23 0 or because federal courts decide cases involving
matters of tribal law after exhaustion is rejected.231 As the
courts in Iowa Mutual, Weeks Construction, and Stock West H
(en banc) recognized, this practice infringes on tribal court inter-
pretative authority over matters of tribal law.23 2 In addition,
the particularized inquiry leads to infringement of tribal court
adjudicatory authority by causing cases that fall under concur-
rent federal and tribal court jurisdiction to be litigated first in
federal court.233
Finally, the bright line rule better comports with federal in-
stitutional principles. Adoption of a judicially-applied "pruden-
tial" test lends itself too readily to encroachments by the federal
judiciary on tribal sovereignty. The decisions in Myrick and
Duncan Energy offer clear examples of this potential realized.234
Under "plenary power," defining limits on tribal sovereignty, in-
cluding the power of tribal court systems, remains the domain of
Congress as a fundamentally political question.2 35 Judicial re-
spect for the roles of Congress and the judiciary mandates strict
scrutiny of congressionally enacted limitations on tribal court
authority and the avoidance of judicially created ones.
228. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
229. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1986).
230. See, e.g., Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F.2d at 755 (dis-
tinguishing Myrick from National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, Kishell, and
Weeks because those cases involved "primarily intra-tribal" interests).
231. Altheimer presents one clear example of this problem. 983 F.2d at 812.
The Seventh Circuit, after describing the case as one involving primarily fed-
eral law, resolved one of the two principle issues in the case by interpreting the
tribe's own law and order code. Id.
232. See supra notes 53, 133, 126 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 169-182 and accompanying text.
235. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress' authority over Indian
matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts inadjusting relations
between and among tribes and their members correspondingly restrained.")
(citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)).
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In short, the Ninth and Tenth Circuit rule offers the advan-
tages of clarity and economy. The rule also avoids frustrating
the goals of Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union that oc-
curs with the particularized inquiry.
3. The Blue Legs and Northern States Power Rulings
The outcomes in Blue Legs and Northern States Power indi-
cate that the Eighth Circuit's general solicitude for the exhaus-
tion requirement may not extend beyond cases in which the
tribe's jurisdiction is limited by traditional Indian law consider-
ations such as treaties, federal common law doctrines, or stat-
utes addressing particularly "Indian" issues. In both Blue Legs
and Northern States Power, the Eighth Circuit rejected attempts
to require exhaustion when tribal authority was arguably lim-
ited by statutes dealing with issues of general concern such as
solid waste disposal and nuclear materials transport.236
National Farmers Union, however, contemplates that tribal
courts will review in the first instance federal statutes that ar-
guably limit tribal authority. The Court states that, "the exist-
ence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, ... as well as a de-
tailed study of relevant statutes.... We believe that examina-
tion should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court
itself."237 Of course, RCRA and the HMTA may limit tribal ju-
risdiction or tribal court authority. Yet National Farmers Union
requires that the tribal court address this issue in the first in-
stance. No principled distinction exists between the traditional
limitations on tribal authority that the Eighth Circuit requires
to be addressed by the tribal court and the federal statutory lim-
itations addressed in Blue Legs and Northern States Power.
Northern States Power illustrates further reasons why the
tribal court should be allowed to address its jurisdiction in the
first instance. Considerations of ripeness dictate that a federal
court should not decide whether a tribal ordinance would inter-
fere with a federal statutory goal until the nature and fact of
that interference are established by concrete tribal action. More
importantly, determining the manner in which a tribal ordi-
236. Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux In-
dian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 459 (8th Cir. 1993) (nuclear material trans-
port); Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1095
(8th Cir. 1989) (solid waste disposal).




nance will operate and the effect it will have on federal interests
requires an interpretation of the tribal ordinance, which Iowa
Mutual and the Eighth Circuit's own ruling in Weeks Construc-
tion make the unique province of the tribal court. The Eighth
Circuit avoided this point in Northern States Power by describ-
ing the effects of the tribal ordinance as a "factual determina-
tion[ I" for the district court.238 That "factual determination,"
however, plainly involved the construction of tribal ordinances,
which is at the core of the values underlying Iowa Mutual. Fi-
nally, as with a Pullman abstention,239 inter-sovereign consider-
ations suggest that the tribal court be given an opportunity to
search for a construction of the tribal ordinance that would
avoid illegality, thereby adhering to the general federal policy of
avoiding unnecessary or undue infringement on tribal self-
government.
In addition to these considerations, a rule suggesting that
tribal exhaustion is unnecessary when a statute of general ap-
plication arguably limits tribal court jurisdiction, begs the ques-
tion of whether the statute at issue even applies to particular
Indians and Indian tribes. As a general matter, statutes of gen-
eral concern or application do not apply to Indians or Indian
tribes when those statutes would affect treaty rights or tribal
self-governent. 240 Thus, the threshold question of whether
such statutes even apply to a given tribe requires the type of
analysis of Indian treaties and tribal interests which lies at the
heart of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
In short, the rule suggested by Blue Legs and Northern
States Power is not based on a principled distinction between
those cases and National Farmers Union. The rule also ignores
the basic values underlying the exhaustion doctrine. This is not
to say that the Eighth Circuit was wrong insofar as it inter-
preted RCRA's and the HMTA's effects on tribal sovereignty.
Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union, however, require
that the tribal court have the first opportunity to make that rul-
ing unless the statute is so clear that the exercise of tribal juris-
diction would be patently violative of express jurisdictional
limitations.
238. See Northern States Power, 991 F.2d at 463.
239. See supra note 127.
240. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d
246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the ADEA does not apply to tribal entities
because employment is an internal tribal matter).
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III. FEDERAL REVIEW AFTER EXHAUSTION
Both National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual provide
that after exhausting tribal court remedies, the losing party has
the right to challenge the tribal court's jurisdictional ruling in
federal court. Iowa Mutual makes clear that the parties may
not relitigate their federal claims beyond the jurisdictional chal-
lenge, unless and until the federal court determines that the tri-
bal court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.241 Thus, under
Iowa Mutual, the tribal court's jurisdiction is a threshold issue
in a federal proceeding.
This opportunity for review places the district court in the
unique position of resolving a dispute over tribal court jurisdic-
tion that the same parties have already litigated in another sov-
ereign's forum. As a result, the district court enters the dispute
after the tribal court has already resolved substantial questions
of law and fact. These questions include interpretations of fed-
eral law necessary to determine the tribal court's jurisdiction,
interpretations of jurisdictional limitations that the tribe's own
laws have imposed upon the tribal court, and findings of fact
that the tribal court has made to resolve the jurisdictional dis-
pute. Even before deciding the jurisdictional issue, the federal
court must decide how to treat the interpretations of law and
findings of fact it receives from the tribal court.
A federal district court should review the tribal court's con-
struction ofjurisdictional limitations contained in federal law de
novo. While a state court's ruling on jurisdiction, even as lim-
ited by federal law, is reviewable only on appeal to the Supreme
Court, National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual clearly con-
template district court review of the federal law limitations on
tribal court jurisdiction. The federal court is clearly the appro-
priate forum to interpret federal law; indeed, the only federal
241. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). Lower courts
that have been asked to review tribal court decisions have steadfastly adhered
to Iowa Mutual's requirement that they limit their inquiry to jurisdictional
matters and not review the tribal court's substantive decision on the merits.
See, e.g., LaBeau v. Dakota, 815 F. Supp. 1074, 1076-77 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (stat-
ing it can only determine whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to determine
custody, not whether the tribal court's custody decision was correct); Sandman
v. Dakota, 816 F. Supp. 448, 451 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (same). Interestingly,
although a tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction is reviewable under National
Farmers Union, a tribal court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction may not be. See
Sulcer v. Davis, 986 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished disposition) (avail-
able at No. 92-6079, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3457, at *7-9) (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3150 (Oct. 4, 1993).
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court to consider this precise issue so concluded.242 More diffi-
cult questions arise in the context of the tribal court's interpre-
tation of jurisdictional limitations contained in tribal law and
the findings of fact necessary to rule on jurisdictional limitations
in both federal and tribal law.
A. INTERPRETATIONS OF TRIBAL LAW
Only three cases have arisen in which federal courts have
considered jurisdictional limitations imposed on tribal courts by
tribal law, after the tribal court had interpreted and applied
those same limitations in a case between the same parties. In
one case, the federal court considered itself bound by the tribal
court's interpretation of the tribe's own law.243 In the other two,
the federal courts reviewed the tribal law questions de novo and
reversed the rulings of the tribal court.2 "
In Sanders v. Robinson, a non-Indian plaintiff challenged
the tribal court's jurisdiction over a divorce action that a tribal
member filed against him, after first exhausting his tribal court
remedies.2 45 Without discussion of the tribal constitutional and
code provisions at issue, the Ninth Circuit simply stated that,
"[tlhe Northern Cheyenne Appellate Court has held (in this
same case) that these provisions permit tribal court jurisdiction
over a non-Indian married to an enrolled member of the tribe.
That court's interpretation of tribal law is binding on this
court."
2 4 6
By contrast, in both Twin City Construction v. Turtle Moun-
tain Indians24 7 and Heinert v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,2 48 Eighth
Circuit district courts considered cases that had proceeded
through the tribal system. In each case the tribal constitution
provided that tribal courts would only have jurisdiction over
non-Indians if they "consent" or "submit" to tribal court jurisdic-
tion.24 9 The tribal courts found that the constitutional provi-
242. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991).
243. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 247-251 and accompanying text.
245. 864 F.2d 630, 631 (9th Cir.), amended, No. 87-4192, 1988 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17047 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
246. Id. at 633.
247. 866 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (5-5 affirmance), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1085 (1989).
248. 14 INDrAN L. REP. 3033 (D.S.D. Mar. 14, 1985).
249. Parisien v. Twin City Constr. Co., 16 INDuAN L. REP. 6012, 6013 (Turt.
Mt. Tr. Ct. App., June 6, 1986) ("submit"); Heinert, 14 INDiAN L. lP. at 3035
("consent").
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sions in each case did not bar jurisdiction by adopting a broad
conception of "consent" that stemmed from the non-Indian's
presence on the reservation and contacts with tribal mem-
bers.250 Nonetheless, the district courts in both cases ignored
the tribal court interpretation of tribal laws and enjoined the
tribal courts from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the
cases.251 Once again, the lower courts have developed a conflict
concerning the implementation of the exhaustion requirement.
These cases raise the question of whether a tribal court's inter-
pretation of its own laws should bind a federal court.
The most persuasive answer is yes, based on the analogous
situation of the effect of state court interpretations of state law
on federal courts. Federal courts are bound by state court inter-
pretations of a state's own laws.252 The Supreme Court held in
Talton v. Mayes that the same interpretive considerations apply
to tribal court interpretations of tribal law.253 In Talton, the
plaintiff argued that the Cherokee tribal court's use of a five-
person grand jury to return his indictment violated Cherokee
law because the tribe had repealed the statute allowing for such
grand juries.2 54 The Supreme Court rejected this claim:
[T]he determination of what was the existing law of the Cherokee Na-
tion as to the constitution of the grand jury [was] solely a matter
within the jurisdiction of the courts of that nation.... Such has been
the decision of this court with reference to similar contentions arising
upon an indictment and conviction in a state court. In re Duncan, 139
U.S. 449. The ruling in that case is equally applicable to the conten-
tions in this particular arising from the record before us.255
The ruling in Duncan, which the Supreme Court deemed
"equally applicable" between state and tribal courts, stated that
"[w]hether certain [state] statutes have or have not binding force
it is for the state to determine,"256 or, "[a]s a matter of propriety
and right, the decision of the state courts on the question as to
250. Parisien, 16 INDAN L. REP. at 6014 (stating that "[nion-Indian conduct
allegedly has affected directly the health and welfare of a tribal member," thus
giving the tribe a governmental interest in the matter); Heinert, 14 INDIAN L.
REP. at 3034 (stating that the tribal court denied a special appearance by non-
tribal member plaintiffs in which they claimed that they did not consent to
jurisdiction).
251. Twin City, 866 F.2d at 971-72; Heinert, 14 INDIAN L. REP. at 3035.
252. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325, 1329 (8th
Cir. 1985).
253. 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896).
254. Id. at 379.
255. Id. at 385.




what are the laws of a state is binding upon those of the United
States." 2
57
This rule comports with principles of tribal sovereignty and
common sense. Among a tribe's sovereign powers is the author-
ity to declare its own laws. Substitution by a federal court of its
own view of tribal law for that announced by tribal forums vio-
lates a tribe's sovereignty. 258 Indeed, because tribal courts nor-
mally have the power to interpret tribal laws by the organic laws
of the tribes, it is a pure contradiction in terms for a federal
court to declare that tribal law is not precisely what the tribe's
high court announces.
In addition, the considerations underlying Iowa Mutual
support application of the tribal court's interpretation of tribal
law. As the Court stated in Iowa Mutual, the tribal court is
"best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law."2 59 This is true
not only because of the proximity of the tribal court to tribal con-
ditions and decisionmakers, but also because the tribal court
will, in most instances, have the greatest knowledge of tribal
court precedent. Such precedent is often unavailable to federal
courts because tribal court decisions are often unpublished.2
60
257. Id. at 456; see also Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1976)
(stating that federal courts "should accept the interpretation [of state constitu-
tions] of the courts of that state unless there are federal constitutional ques-
tions involved.... [L]ike deference should be given to tribal courts in regard to
their interpretation of tribal constitutions.")
258. See FELaX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 247 (Rennard
Strickland ed., 1982); see also Pace, supra note 216, at 466-67.
259. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
260. See Pace, supra note 216, at 461 ("Deference is... warranted because
tribal interpretations may differ significantly from a federal court's interpreta-
tion based on the influence of unwritten Indian traditions and customs on a
tribal court."); see also Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Es-
say on Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZAGA L. REV. 393.
Professor Ponmersheim argues persuasively that tribal courts should enjoy
wide latitude to interpret tribal constitutions in accordance with the particular-
ized traditions and cultural notions of law of each tribe. Id. at 406. He notes
that the texts of tribal constitutions will rarely reflect such values because
many tribal constitutions were drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs shortly
after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
469 (1988). Id. at 396. As such, they tend to reflect the Bureau's own institu-
tional values rather than the tribes'. Id. at 397. In addition, the constitutional
amendment process dictated by Congress is cumbersome for tribes to use. See
25 U.S.C. § 476. Professor Pommersheim points out that tribal courts can util-
ize their powers of interpretation as one useful mechanism to bring the tribal
constitutions closer to the individual desires of the various tribes concerning
their own organic laws. Ponmmersheim, supra, at 401-02. As a result, federal
court "re-interpretations" would not only contravene important tribal goals of
cultural and legal self-determination, but federal courts will often err concern-
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Nothing in National Farmers Union contravenes these clear
rules. Although National Farmers Union contemplates federal
court review of the tribal court's jurisdictional ruling, it appears
that the Supreme Court contemplated review of the federal law
issues only: "When [petitioners] invoke the jurisdiction of a fed-
eral court under § 1331, they must contend that federal law has
curtailed the powers of the Tribe, and thus afforded them the
basis for the relief they seek in a federal forum."261
Thus, the rule applied when challenging tribal court juris-
diction in federal court should parallel the rule applied by fed-
eral courts when interpreting state "long-arm" statutes in
diversity cases. In such cases, the state court's interpretation of
its own state "long-arm" statute binds the federal court, which
then applies federal interpretations of applicable constitutional
jurisdictional limitations.262 Similarly, when reviewing tribal
jurisdiction, the tribal court's interpretation of tribal law should
bind the federal court, which should only review the federal law
question de novo. 263
B. TRiBAL COURT FINDINGS OF FACT
The most difficult question is also the question that federal
courts least frequently address: what effect should the federal
court give the tribal court findings of jurisdictional facts? In
many cases, determination of this issue alone may determine
the outcome. In areas in which federal law is sufficiently clear,
the tribal court findings of fact, if accepted, can render the fed-
eral court decision a fait accompli.
Only one federal court has addressed this critical issue,
however. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in FMC v.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, held that district courts should apply
the "clearly erroneous" standard to review factual findings by
tribal courts. 264 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court
wanted tribal courts to "develop the factual record" and that the
ing questions of tribal law because they will rely too heavily on textual, rather
than historical and cultural, understandings of tribal law.
261. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985) (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 653
(8th Cir. 1982) (accepting Arkansas's interpretation of state "long-arm" statute
as allowing all constitutionally permissible jurisdiction).
263. Cf Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633-34(9th Cir.), amended, No.
87-4192, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 17047 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1110 (1989). (accepting state court interpretation of degree of deference to
tribal courts).
264. 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1404(1991).
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clearly erroneous standard of review "accords with traditional
judicial policy of respecting the fact-finding ability of the court of
first instance."265
The Supreme Court's treatment of factual findings made in
non-federal forums has varied over time and between applica-
tions. Most recently, the Court's concern with judicial economy
and its respect for the role of state judicial bodies in the federal
system have led the Court toward its result in University of Ten-
nessee v. Elliot.266 The final portion of this Article analyzes the
Court's current approach to factual findings made in other sov-
ereigns' forums and shows how that approach suggests that fac-
tual findings by tribal courts should bind federal courts.
1. Issue Preclusion Between Sovereign Forums: The Elliot
Conception
In Elliot, the Supreme Court considered whether the factual
findings of a state administrative law judge binds a litigant who
filed federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.267 Elliot arose out of the
discharge of a state university employee who, upon receiving
news of his discharge, simultaneously requested an administra-
tive hearing from the university and filed suit in federal district
court. The employee claimed that the discharge was racially dis-
criminatory and therefore violated § 1983 and Title VII. 268 The
district court allowed the state administrative hearing to go for-
ward and an extensive factflnding process ensued.269 At the
close of the administrative hearing, the factfinder, the "adminis-
trative assistant to the Vice President for Agriculture of the Uni-
versity of Tennessee,"270 found that the plaintiff's discharge was
not "racially motivated."271 That finding, if applied by the fed-
eral court, would have foreclosed the § 1983 claim.
265. Id.
266. 478 U.S. 788 (1986). For an older conception, used in the context of
Pullman abstention cases in which the proponent of federal jurisdiction has
elected to reserve the federal claims by not litigating in the federal forum, see
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964),
overruled by Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. H 1991).
268. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 790-91.
269. Id. at 791.
270. The majority decision describes the administrative fact-finder in Elliott
as an "administrative law judge." Id. Only the dissent names the fact-finder's
precise title. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 791.
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In deciding whether to give that finding preclusive effect,
the Supreme Court first determined that findings by state ad-
ministrative law judges did not qualify for treatment under the
"full faith and credit" provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738,272 which
require federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court rul-
ings and factual findings.273 The Court thus endeavored to con-
sider whether to develop a "federal common law rule[ ] of
preclusion in the absence of a governing statute."274
The Court then posited that courts should presume that
preclusion applies unless they find Congressional intent to make
an exception. 275 The Court justified the presumption in favor of
preclusion on two grounds. The rule of preclusion "serves the
value underlying general principles of collateral estoppel: en-
forcing repose. This value, which encompasses both the parties'
interest in conserving judicial resources.., is equally implicated
whether fact-finding is done by a federal or state agency."276 In
addition, the Court noted that "[h]aving federal courts give
preclusive effect to the factfinding of state administrative tribu-
nals also serves the value of federalism" underlying the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and
acts as a nationally unifying force.277 A contrary rule, the Court
found, would undercut that "value" by leaving "the courts of a
second forum, state or federal, free to reach conflicting
results."278
The Supreme Court then applied its newly-created pre-
sumption in favor of preclusion. It found that Congress's intent
in enacting Title VII overcame the presumption favoring preclu-
sion and allowed the plaintiff to relitigate the facts of his Title
VII claim.2 79 The Court, however, found no such congressional
intent with respect to § 1983 and considered the plaintiff bound
by the administrative findings in his § 1983 claim.28 0
272. Id. at 794. Section 1738 provides that federal courts are bound by legal
and factual rulings made by state courts in cases properly before them. 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
273. 478 U.S. at 794-795.
274. Id. at 795.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 798 (citation and footnote omitted).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 799.
279. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs' apparent willing-
ness to litigate the factual questions in the state administrative forum should
affect the application of rules of issue preclusion. Id. at 796 n.5
280. Id. at 797-99.
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Five years later, the Court reiterated Elliot's analysis in As-
toria Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino, appealing
to the virtues of judicial economy.28 ' The Court again analyzed
the precise federal statute under which the plaintiff sought re-
lief to determine whether the statute's language or purpose
overcame "the lenient presumption in favor of administrative es-
toppel."28 2 The Court found that the provisions of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967283 overcame that
presumption and that rules of preclusion did not apply.28 4 The
Court relied on the Act's requirement that the parties exhaust
state remedies before returning to federal court.28 5 Congress
certainly would not, the Court reasoned, provide complainants a
federal court remedy that could be rendered "strictly pro forma"
by the results of the preceding state court action.286
2. Issue Preclusion Between Tribal and Federal Courts:
Reconciling Elliot with the Role of Tribal Courts
Elliot represents values which readily transfer to issue pre-
clusion between federal and tribal courts. If nothing else, El-
liot's emergent appeal to economy and cohesion within the
federal system dictate that preclusion should apply. More sig-
nificantly, Elliot's reliance upon Congress to limit rules of inter-
sovereign preclusion applies squarely to the role of Congress vis-
a-vis the sovereign powers of Indian tribes.
Issue preclusion between tribal and federal courts after ex-
haustion can easily be placed into this emergent framework by
applying the same analysis. The identical virtues of judicial
economy and inter-sovereign cohesion which justify the pre-
sumption in favor of preclusion apply as well to the tribal court
findings.28 7 Indeed, the policies underlying National Farmers
281. 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169-71 (1991).
282. Id. at 2172.
283. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
284. Astoria, 111 S. Ct. at 2171.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Critics of tribal courts often appeal to a supposed lack of quality of tri-
bal courts and tribal court decision-makers as a justification for refusing to ac-
cord tribal court determinations equal respect with state court determinations.
See Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1407, 1418-23 (1985). As commentators point out, however,
these same considerations are present in varying degrees within numerous
state forums. Id. at 1408. Indeed, local bias against distant litigants is the
acknowledged basis for federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. See Iowa Mut. Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). Local bias and parochial favor were also
the initial impetus for creating lower federal courts with jurisdiction over fed-
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Union and Iowa Mutual-promoting federal courts and relying
on tribal courts' expertise in interpreting federal jurisdictional
law-give these principles added weight. Absent a rule of pre-
clusion, parties challenging tribal court jurisdiction would sim-
ply ignore the tribal court proceedings, especially in cases in
which the adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction of the tribe is
the principle disputed issue.288 This would frustrate the goals of
Iowa Mutual by usurping tribal courts' ability to apply the law
eral questions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The most
discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found
to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes.... State
judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too
little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national
laws.").
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to "look behind" the fact-
finder when analyzing issues of comity and inter-sovereign issue preclusion.
For example, in Elliott, the majority was completely unconcerned that the state
administrative fact-finder was actually a subordinate employee of one of the
parties. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 791 (1986). As for
tribal courts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attacks on their abili-
ties to fairly and competently adjudicate disputes involving both Indians and
non-Indians. See generally Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687 (1989) ("It is true
that our decisions recognize broader retained tribal powers outside the criminal
context. Tribal courts... resolve civil disputes involving nonmembers, includ-
ing non-Indians."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) ('Tri-
bal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property in-
terests of both Indians and non-Indians.... Nonjudicial tribal institutions have
also been recognized as competent law-applying bodies.") (citations omitted);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1958) (holding that state court did not have
jurisdiction over controversy between Indian and non-Indian parties).
In any event, according respect to tribal court determinations is most likely
the ready cure for any deficiencies of tribal courts. Greater responsibility over
decisions will naturally lead tribes to devote more resources to their tribal
courts, especially now that funding for tribal governmental functions has be-
come widely available through the contracting mechanism for which the Indian
Education and Self-Determination Act provides. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988 &
Supp. II 1991). Greater respect for the role of tribal court judges will also nat-
urally attract legally-trained people to tribal court judgeships. In addition,
continual exposure to complex questions of federal law will provide tribal courts
with growing expertise. See Middlemist v. Secretary of United States Dep't of
Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 945 (D. Mont. 1993).
288. In cases such as Burlington Northern I and II and Duncan Energy, in
which the only issue in the case was the extent of tribal jurisdiction, see supra
notes 91, 98, 178, the party opposing tribal court jurisdiction would have strong
financial (and possibly emotional) incentives to simply default or not present
evidence in the tribal court action if they knew they would simply receive a trial
de novo on the only disputed issue in federal district court after exhaustion.
Such litigants are unlikely to undertake costly and time-consuming presenta-
tions of evidence before a fact-finder whose factual findings would only be cast
aside on review in a separate forum.
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meaningfully to fairly litigated factual situations and by eroding
respect for tribal courts. In short, the factors that justified the
presumption in favor of preclusion for state courts apply equally
to tribal courts. This presumption prevails, unless the federal
remedy identified in National Farmers Union dictates
otherwise.
Unlike in Elliot and Astoria, litigants' post-exhaustion fed-
eral remedy is not congressionally created, being normally a
creature of judge-made "federal common law." One simple an-
swer then, is that there is no congressional intent underlying
the post-exhaustion federal remedy that could overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of preclusion. In the absence of countervailing
congressional purpose, the presumption should apply and tribal
court findings of fact should be given preclusive effect. This
analysis has the added virtue of being entirely consistent with
the Supreme Court's conceptions of tribal courts in Santa Clara
Pueblo and Iowa Mutual-that the authority of tribal courts
over reservation affairs remains unlimited except to the extent
Congress has expressly imposed limitations.
The fact that the federal law limitations on tribal court ju-
risdiction occasionally arise out of statutes, such as the Allot-
ment Acts, or treaties that the Supreme Court has read to
diminish tribal authority, adds some complexity to the analy-
sis. 28 9 Such statutes, however, rarely address the availability of
federal remedies or the manner in which they are to be applied,
let alone with the clarity found in Title VII or the ADEA, as in
Elliot and Astoria. Yet Elliot makes clear that a mere congres-
sional desire to limit tribal authority cannot overcome the pre-
sumption favoring preclusion. 290 Section 1983, the statute at
issue in Elliot, was designed to provide a federal remedy against
abuses of state power. 29 ' If the purpose of § 1983 fell short, so
must the implied purposes of legislation such as the Allotment
Acts. What appears to be necessary for a statute to overcome
the presumption is a congressional concern for the integrity of
the federal remedy itself. Only in rare instances will a federal
289. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,558-59 (1981) (stating that
the effects of the Allotment Acts diminished tribal regulatory authority over
non-Indian hunting and fishing on allotted lands owned in fee patent simple);
see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 409 (1989) (holding that tribal authority to zone land use by non-
Indians of land allotted under the Allotment Acts is diminished).
290. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986).
291. For a description of the purposes of § 1983, see Ivy Club v. Edwards,
943 F.2d 270, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1991) (collecting authorities).
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statute limiting tribal authority also evidence such an intent on
the part of Congress. 2 92 This analysis makes clear that in order
to place tribal court exhaustion within a coherent framework of
federal jurisprudence, tribal court findings of fact should bind
federal courts in the same manner as state forum findings, un-
less the party challenging the tribal court's jurisdiction can
point to a statutory scheme that manifests a specific congres-
sional intent to create a federal court remedy against tribal
power.
29 3
As an aside, there is one difference between administrative
preclusion at issue in Elliot and Astoria and preclusion applied
to tribal courts. The Court in Astoria characterized the pre-
sumption in favor of administrative preclusion as a "lenient"
one, which is easily overcome by a slight indication of congres-
sional intent.294 The Court also noted that the clarity of con-
gressional intent necessary to overcome judicially-created
common law presumptions of this type varies with the values
and subject matter affected by the rule.2 95 In many areas, a rule
of "plain statement and strict construction prevail[s]." 296 Of
course, the Supreme Court also made clear in Santa Clara
292. One such instance may be criminal cases in which habeas corpus is
utilized under the Indian Civil Rights Act. In many instances, federal courts
consider the factual questions de novo when federal habeas is used to challenge
state court criminal prosecutions. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S.
411, 417 n.8. Exhaustion may not be applicable, however, in cases where
habeas is used to challenge the tribal court's criminal jurisdiction. Greywater
v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1988).
293. Other commentators have suggested that the same result could be
reached through an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which precludes federal
courts from re-examining findings of fact made in state courts and which would
consider tribal courts tantamount to state courts and thus entitled to the bene-
fits of § 1738. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 16, at 897-908. There are two
problems with this analysis. First, tribal courts do not fit into the federal sys-
tem as readily as state courts, as the commentators recognize. In addition,
Iowa Mutual and Santa Clara make clear that tribal courts, which are manifes-
tations of power by non-constitutional sovereigns, do not depend on congres-
sional grants of authority for their power. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9, 18 (1987); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-57 (1978).
Rather, they have all powers of which they have not been expressly divested.
Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18; Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55-57. Thus, the Elliott
analysis, which presumes the existence of the rule of preclusion in the absence
of an express divestiture, is more consistent with the role of tribes than an anal-
ysis based on § 1738, which depends on a new and separate congressional grant
of power.
294. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166,
2172 (1991).




Pueblo and Iowa Mutual that potential infringements on tribal
sovereignty and the authority of tribal courts is one such
area.297 Thus, distinct from administrative estoppel, tribal
court preclusion should not rest on a "lenient presumption" but
stand absent a "plain statement" to the contrary. The foregoing
analysis leads to the conclusion that the "clearly erroneous"
standard of FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes falls short of the
proper rule.29 8 Indeed, the "clearly erroneous" standard arises
out of rules of appeal among forums of the same sovereign.
More important, the "clearly erroneous" standard is grafted
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,299 which are congressionally-created statu-
tory bases for decision. Among tribal and federal courts, no
statutory bases exist for a rule of decision that could similarly
limit the effect of tribal court findings of fact. The rule of FMC
thus appears inappropriate in the absence of congressional ex-
pression to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
The uneasy fit between tribal and federal courts most likely
results from the lack of explicit definition of the status of Indian
nations in the Constitution and from the inherent limitations of
the "plenary power" doctrine as an answer to questions that
more than merely define the regulatory power of Congress over
Indians and Indian tribes. Some commentators have even sug-
gested that the treatment of tribal courts is best handled in the
context of international law and the rules of comity applied by
federal courts to the rulings of foreign nation tribunals-a result
certainly consistent with the sovereign-to-sovereign relations
that the treaty-based arrangements between the United States
and the Indian nations contemplated.300
The Supreme Court, however, seems determined to draw
the tribal courts into the federal system by developing a rela-
tionship between federal and tribal courts, just as it did for regu-
latory authority with the "plenary power" doctrine. If this must
be so, the final "fit" developed between tribal and federal courts
should recognize the separate nature of tribal governments, the
297. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18; Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58-59.
298. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
299. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988) provides that fact-finding by federal admin-
istrative agencies is evaluated based on a "substantial evidence" test.
300. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 22, at 904-08 (discussing application by
state courts of the comity doctrine to tribal governments).
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firm federal policy promoting tribal self-government, and the
consistent doctrine that limitations on tribal authority must
stem from acts of Congress and rest on clear indications of con-
gressional intent, not judicial fiat.
Adherence to the principles announced in Iowa Mutual and
National Farmers Union and the rule of respect for the judici-
ary's limited role in defining the parameters of tribal sover-
eignty dictate application of the bright line rules requiring
exhaustion as applied by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The
particularized inquiry which has arisen in other circuits defeats
these principles. If courts faithfully apply the bright line rules,
respect for tribal courts will increase, competition between fed-
eral and tribal courts will decrease, litigants will know from the
first instant how to proceed with their case, and limitations on
tribal sovereign authority will remain within Congressional
power. After exhaustion, consistency with general principles of
law governing the relations between courts of different sover-
eigns requires that tribal court interpretations of tribal law bind
federal courts, and that the ordinary rules of issue preclusion
apply in all but the rare case of an identifiable congressional in-
tent to the contrary.
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